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ABSTRACT 
More and more people rely on Web information and with the advance of Web 2.0 technologies they can increasingly 
easily participate to the creation of this information. Country-level politicians could not ignore this trend and have started 
to use the Web to promote them or to demote their opponents. This paper presents how candidates to a French mayor 
local election and with less budget have engineered their Web campaign and online reputation. After presenting the 
settings of the local election, the Web tools used by the different candidates and the local journalists are detailed. These 
tools are evaluated from a security point of view and the legal issues that they have created are underlined.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Web 2.0 technologies have increasingly facilitated the online publication of information by the users. The 
Web has become so pervasive that many politicians have adopted these Web technologies to promote their 
political parties, drive their election campaign and build their online political reputation. For example, during 
the 2007 French presidential elections, one of the main candidates proposed a Web-based participatory forum 
where users could submit ideas that other users could vote and comment. Similarly to the online tools 
presented in this paper, that participatory forum was not so secure, for example, it was possible to vote 
several times by creating different accounts. Another example is Barack Obama who has set up his own 
online social network with over 1.5 million friends and over 45 000 followers on Twitter [N08]. Even if the 
main candidates running for national political elections have an important budget, embracing a perfect online 
Web campaign is still very hard to achieve due to the distributed aspect of the Web where counter sites or 
defaming information can be propagated. In this paper, we investigate how candidates to a French mayor 
election and with less budget than national elections engineered their Web campaign. In Section 2, we 
describe the settings of the local election case study. These tools are then evaluated from a security point of 
view in Section 3.  We draw our conclusion in Section 4. 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE LOCAL ELECTION AND ITS WEB TOOLS  
We first present the general settings of the studied local election. Then, we detail the technical settings of the 
online tools used during this election. 
 
2.1 Local Election General Settings 
The studied local election happened in March 2008 during the French municipalities local elections. The 
studied municipality, namely Megève, one of the twelve Best of the Alps ski resorts, has around 3 900 voters. 
Two candidates ran for the elections to become the mayor of this municipality. The municipality politicians 
had been in place for twelve years for most of them. They had not to fight for their position six years ago at 
the time of the previous election because there was only one candidate. The status of the municipality has 
been quite worrisome because its population has decreased from more than 5 200 permanent people in the 
mid-eighties to around 4112 in 2007. This village is a well-known touristic place where the price of 
properties keep increasing. Due to too high French inheritance taxes, local people cannot afford to keep their 
family properties at time of inheritance. They have to sell their properties and then have to leave the village 
due to the high renting prices. The winning candidate obtained around 70% of the votes. Debates were quite 
fierce between the two candidates and as explained in the evaluation section below the online tools 
contributed a lot to increase the hostilities.   
Concerning the legal settings, there are French laws (articles from L 47 to L 52-3 [CE]) related to online 
political elections that forbid the actions detailed in the following bullets. These bullets are used in Section 3 
to evaluate the security and legal aspects of the different Web tools used during this election campaign: 
 Defamation of a candidate, in our case via online information; 
 Publication of new information by the candidate the day before the vote and the day of the vote, in 
our case online publication; 
 Publication of surveys results that are not official or statistically correct without informing the 
readers that the results are not statistically correct; 
 Collection of personal information by the candidates, for example, for political newsletters, without 
informing the French privacy protection agency called CNIL [CL] of the existence of this collection. 
2.2 Local Election Technical Settings 
The five main Web-based tools that were involved in the political debate are described below. The fifth one 
had been set up by us as part of a broader research project on the impact of online social networking tools on 
village communities. It is worth mentioning that it was the first time that the mayor local elections involved 
online tools in this municipality.   
 
2.2.1 Candidate A's Web site 
The official tool of the first candidate was a standard static Web site consisting of four HTML pages hosted 
by 1and1.com and mainly automatically generated by the 1and1 WYSIWYG Web site creator. The domain 
name was booked on the 24th of January 2008 and was the first to be publicly available. An online video of 
the candidate was available on the main page. The page views counts was managed by an image marker 
embedded by a third party traffic monitoring service. The cost of this Web site (excluding the cost of the 
knowledge and the two to five hours to set it up) is estimated at around 12 Euros, which corresponds to the 
price of the 1and1.com account for one year. 
 
2.2.2 Candidate B's Blog 
The second candidate set up a Typepad blog and bought the main domain name on the 9th of February 2008. 
The blog contained both static Web pages as it is possible to set up with Typepad and  blog articles submitted 
from mid-February to the end of the elections in an increasing flow of information. People could subscribe to 
this blog and receive the articles through their blog reader. After each public meetings, YouTube videos of 
these meetings were embedded in articles or pages. No doubt that the WYSIWYG Typepad multi-authoring 
tools facilitated a lot the edition, the administration and the referencing of candidate B's blog. Although the 
comments were open until the day before the election, they did not use the feature to discuss negative 
comments. The advantage is that it seemed more dynamic through the daily submission of articles. The cost 
of that kind of blog (excluding the cost of the knowledge and the hours to edit the content) is estimated at 
around 45 Euros, which corresponds to the price of 3 months of Typepad use.  
 
2.2.3 Candidate A Partisan's Blog 
In October 2007, someone set up a blog to publish articles about what is going on in the village: the touristic 
events, the municipality projects... Based on the articles published by the authors of the blog, it seems clear 
that the authors of the blog were for candidate A who lost the elections. That blog is quite basic and has been 
set up on a French blog provider platform. Google Adsense advertisements are displayed throughout the blog 
pages and articles. The blog is still active. It was worth mentioning that blog because it contributed to the 
violence of the debates similarly to the main local newspaper site detailed below. Both tools are further 
discussed in the legal part of the evaluation section. 
 
2.2.4 Main Local Newspaper's Web site 
The main local newspaper provides a Web platform where its users can create an account and then leave 
comments on the online version of its articles published on its paper-based version. The comments are 
directly published and then manually moderated if someone reports an issue via an email.  It is also possible 
to vote for an article on a 5-star scale or for a comment with a thumb-up or thumb-down without being 
logged in as depicted in Figure 1. The evaluation section below discusses where it failed to comply to the 
legal rules listed in Section 2.1. 
 
Figure 1. Main Local Newspaper Comment Rating 
2.2.5 Our Local Online Social Networking Site 
 
We designed and developed a Java-based online social networking Web site [MAG] dedicated to the 
municipality and its inhabitants to study the impact of such online social tools on such a municipality. The 
users used this site during the municipality campaign. From the beginning of August 2007 to the end of 
February 2008, 41 proposals to improve the village were made on our online social network contributed by 
124 users connected between them as depicted in Figure 2. Each user is placed uniformly around a circle and 
a line, e.g. friendship or family relationship, represents a connection between a user and another user. 
 
Figure 2. Local Online Social Network 
The presentation layer of this site was based on JSP and JSF components from Apache MyFaces. The Web 
server used was Apache Tomcat. The Java objects were persisted in a MySQL database through an Hibernate 
persistence layer. The site was opened to the public in August 2007. The users could create an account linked 
to an email address, whose ownership is verified through an email challenge/response. At the beginning, they 
were only allowed to propose and comment new ideas to improve the village. Those propositions were listed 
in a forum section of the Web site. As they contributed, they earned participation points and the best 
participating users were promoted on a specific ranking page. There were also special users who had been 
coopted as real citizens of the village because they were known by the administrator of the site or other 
previously coopted users. Coopted users were allowed to vote for such or such proposition. To foster 
participation, the users could choose to remain anonymous when adding comments or propositions. The site 
is now based on Drupal and its list of functionalities has changed as well as its use, which is much lower than 
during the elections. 
2.2.6 Overall Use of the Different Tools  
Both candidates used a few other e-tools for their campaign. They submitted emailings through various 
means: the mailing list  collected through their Web site, messages to Facebook groups (one candidate had 
set up a Facebook account), and allegedly even through unsolicited mass e-mailing as explained in the 
security evaluation below. To estimate that traffic, given that the counter on the main page of candidate's A 
Web site displayed 1 579 views on the 1st of March and that this Web site has 4 pages, around 6 000 pages 
may have been viewed on candidate's A Web site. Concerning candidate's B blog, the Typepad views tool 
counted 25 353 pages views over approximately the same period of time. Figure 3 shows the distribution of 
the number of page views per day. The first peak corresponds to when the local newspaper published its 
article describing the candidate B's team and project with a reference to the blog URL. The second peak 
corresponds to just after the election day and results. The number of views varied base on whether or not a 
blog article was posted on that day and if it contained a video of the new meetings or not. Thus, it seems that  
the blog approach attracted more page views than the static Web page approach.  
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Figure 3. Candidate B's Blog Daily Number of Page Views 
3. SECURITY DISCUSSION 
In this section, we start by discussing the different legal aspects introduced in section 2.1: 
 Declaration of personal data collection to the CNIL [CL]: Although it is mandatory to declare 
information collection and the declaration is quite easy through an online form, one of the 
candidates did not mention its CNIL declaration number on its Web site. In addition to this number, 
only one candidate respected the rule to clearly mention who was the editor of the information found 
on the Web pages. Another privacy issue happened because one of the candidates allegedly mass 
emailed to potential voters without having obtained their consent before submission of the emailing. 
Thus, anti-spam laws have not been respected. CNIL and editor information is present on the main 
local newspaper Web and our local social network. This point was less relevant to the partisan's 
blog. 
 No publication of new information the day before the vote and the day of the vote: Both candidates 
seem to have respected this rule. The blog was not updated after the deadline and its comments 
features were disabled. The Web site of the other candidate did not change a lot anyway from the 
start to the end because it was not a blog with daily blog articles. The partisan's blog also respected 
this rule. The administrators of the main local newspaper platform had disabled the comments on the 
articles related to this election. We closed down our social network a few days before the elections 
in order to avoid any issue in this regard because we had not planned the functionality to forbid the 
users to publish information. 
 No publication of surveys that are not statistically correct without mentioning it: Neither the 
candidates nor the partisan published surveys. As proposals to improve the village were voted and 
ranked on our online social network, we clearly mentioned that the ranking was not statistically 
correct and did not reflect the views of all the citizens. More detail on the number of people who 
participated to our social network is presented below. The main local newspaper did not clearly 
mention that the articles or comments ratings through the stars or the number of thumbs up and 
down were not representative and statistically correct. In addition, the votes on the comments were 
only protected by cookies and users could easily cheat, for example, just by clearing their cookies 
cache and voting again many times on the same comment. We contacted them to underline these 
issues but they had more important legal issues with their system as discussed below. Our online 
social network was protected against such automated votes thanks to captchas [AB03]. 
 Defamation: The main local newspaper system was involved in a defamation trial and we argue that 
it was mainly due to a bad design of their system. On the 24th of January, the local newspaper 
published an article describing the first candidate, his team and projects for the municipality. 
Comments started quickly to be published and attracted a lot of views. The day of the election, the 
article had been viewed 10 242 times and 406 comments had been added. Almost all comments 
have been voted and many of them have more than 100 votes. The pity is that these comments were 
not moderated before publication and many comments were quite harsh. Furthermore, at the 
beginning, the moderator who checks the comments had not really the time to keep checking these 
comments and did not think it was so important to moderate this thread. On the 11th of February, an 
article covered the other candidate profile, team and projects. Again this article attracted many 
views (7 378 before the election) and 298 comments. The comments becoming more and more 
known and harsher, the persons targeted by the comments started to complain to the newspaper. The 
moderator had to spend more time on checking in real time the flow of comments and eventually 
decided to close the comments submissions after one person sued for defamation. The last message 
from the moderator is copied in Figure 4 (to sum up, the text says that the comments feature has 
been disabled due to defamation trials, by the way, the author of the defamation was found by the 
police after investigations although he used a pseudonym). In contrast, our online social network 
experienced only one proposition to be moderated. It may be because the users felt that they were 
more easily recognized on our specific social network and more information was displayed to them 
regarding the risks that they were encountering. However, we had also to moderate the comments 
after they had been published, which is an issue since the comments still appear for some time on 
the Web site before being moderated. 
 
Figure 4. Final Newspaper Moderator Message 
The situation is clearly unsatisfactory from a security point of view because many of the listed legal aspects 
are not fully respected. From a technical point of view, it seems clear that moderating before publication is a 
required feature. Another technical improvement is to use other protection means than simple cookies for 
vote protection. It should be costly and time consuming for users to cheat. From a user point of view, it is a 
pity that the newspaper did not inform and educate enough the users about the risks of publishing defaming 
information. Most of the users may have thought that they could not be found behind their pseudonyms. As 
said above, the person who published the defaming information involved in the trial has been found and sued 
in mid-July 2008. The newspaper should also have better explained that the results of the votes were not 
representative and not statistically correct. Another user comprehension issue related to security happened. 
Initially we added a captcha to the registration form of our online social network. Many aged users were not 
familiar with that kind of security mechanism and many users reported to us that they did not succeed to 
create an account due to these captchas. Our framework logged how many times users were calling the 
registration page and filling it with success. Before removing the captchas, only around one third of the 
loaded registration pages ended in a successful user registration with all fields and captcha correctly filled 
out. We eventually decided to remove this captcha on the registration page. From a security point of view, it 
is interesting to know how many times the users have chosen to use the anonymization feature on our online 
social network site when reacting to the 41 proposals published on the site. These 41 proposals created 81 
comments and 29 of these comments were made with the anonymization option. Thus, around 35,8 % of the 
comments were anonymized, which may indicate that an anonymization feature may increase the level of 
participation. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Our case-study where local politicians tried to leverage the Web for their political success confirms Anderson 
and Cornfield's statement made in 2000: “there are growing signs that democratic politics will increasingly 
be conducted online” [AC02]. Park and Perry [PP07] found that the “use of campaign web sites is influential 
for giving money to political candidate and sending e-mails urging people to vote with and without reference 
to a particular candidate. However, the impact on voting is negligible”. We do not have the right data to 
apply their evaluation method. We can just report that the candidate who won the local election of our case-
study was the candidate who used the more dynamic blogging platform. Local politicians are still not fully 
aware of the legal aspects that must be respected on the Web, especially regarding defamation. These issues 
also arise for the other actors, citizens and professionals such as the main local newspaper who did not put in 
place enough mechanisms to avoid defamation issues and who did not inform well-enough their users about 
their risks. These legal aspects will have to be addressed in the new open source or hosted technical solutions 
that may be proposed to more easily and more cheaply build participative and interactive political campaigns. 
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